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Abstract
We show how to add the assumption that players know their
opponents’ payoff functions to the theory of learning in games, and
use it to derive restrictions on signaling-game play in the spirit of
divine equilibrium. In our learning model, agents are born into
player roles and play the game against a random opponent each
period. Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing
distribution of opponents’ play, and update their beliefs based on
their observations. Long-lived and patient senders experiment with
every signal that they think might yield an improvement over their
myopically best play. We show that divine equilibrium (Banks and
Sobel, 1987) is nested between “rationality-compatible” equilib-
rium, which corresponds to an upper bound on the set of possible
learning outcomes, and “uniform rationality-compatible” equilib-
rium, which provides a lower bound.
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1 Introduction
Signaling games typically have many perfect Bayesian equilibria, because Bayes
rule does not pin down the receiver’s off-path beliefs about the sender’s type.
Different off-path beliefs for the receiver can justify different off-path receiver
behaviors, which in turn sustain equilibria with a variety of on-path outcomes.
For this reason, applied work using signaling games typically invokes some
equilibrium refinement to obtain a smaller and (hopefully) more accurate sub-
set of predictions.
However, most refinements impose restrictions on the equilibrium beliefs
without any reference to the process that might lead to equilibrium. Our ear-
lier paper Fudenberg and He (2018) provided a learning-theoretic foundation
for the compatibility criterion (CC), based on the idea that “out of equilib-
rium” signals are not zero-probability events during learning, but instead arise
as rare but positive-probability experiments by inexperienced patient senders
trying to learn how the receivers respond to different signals. Unlike the classic
refinement literature, we did not assume that agents know their opponents’
payoff functions. This paper discusses how ex-ante payoff information influ-
ences learning dynamics and learning outcomes, showing that the additional
equilibrium restrictions that follow from this prior knowledge nest the divine
equilibrium of Banks and Sobel (1987). In addition, we provide the first general
sufficient condition for an outcome to emerge as the result of patient Bayesian
learning in settings where the relative probabilities of different off-path exper-
iments matter.
In our learning model, agents repeatedly play the same signaling game
against random opponents each period. Agents are Bayesians who believe
they face a fixed but unknown distribution of the opposing players’ strate-
gies. Importantly, the senders hold independent beliefs about how receivers
respond to different signals, so they cannot use the response to one signal to
infer anything about the distribution of responses to a different signal. This
introduces an exploration-exploitation trade-off, as each sender only observes
the response to the one signal she sends each period. Long-lived and patient
senders will therefore experiment with every signal that they think might yield
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a substantially higher payoff than the signal that is myopically best. The key
to our results is that different types of senders have different incentives for
experimenting with various signals, so that some of the sender types will send
certain signals more often than other types do. Consequently, even though
long-lived senders only experiment for a vanishingly small fraction of their
lifetimes, the play of the long-lived receivers will be a best response to be-
liefs about the senders’ types that reflects this difference in experimentation
probabilities.
Of course, the senders’ experimentation incentives depend on their prior
beliefs about which receiver responses are plausible after each signal. In Fu-
denberg and He (2018), we assumed that learners are ignorant of others’ utility
functions, and that the senders’ beliefs assign positive probability to the re-
ceivers playing actions that are not best responses to any belief about the
sender’s type. In this paper, we instead assume that the players’ prior beliefs
encode knowledge of their opponents’ payoff functions, so in particular the
senders all assign zero probability to the event that the receivers use condi-
tionally dominated strategies. Inexperienced senders with full-support beliefs
about the receivers’ play may experiment with a signal in the hopes that the
receivers respond with a certain favorable action, not knowing that this action
will never be played as it is not a best response to any receiver belief. With
payoff information, even very patient senders will never undertake such exper-
iments. Conversely, receivers know that no sender type would ever want to
play a signal that does not best respond to any receiver strategy, because no
possible response by the receiver would make playing that signal worthwhile.
For this reason, the receivers’ beliefs after each signal assign probability zero
to the types for whom that signal is dominated.
Priors with payoff information lead to additional restrictions on different
types’ comparative experimentation frequencies, which can generate stronger
restrictions on the receiver’s beliefs in some games. For instance, Example 2
considers a signaling game where two types of senders choose between a safe
option Out that yields a known payoff, and a risky option In whose payoff de-
pends on the receiver’s response. The receiver has three responses to In: Up,
which is optimal against the strong sender; Down, which is optimal against
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the weak sender, and X, which is never optimal.1 We show that when priors
encode payoff information, the strong types experiment more with In than the
weak types do. But, this comparison can be reversed when the senders do not
know the receivers’ payoff functions, since the weak types like the X response
more than the strong types do. In this game, the new refinement concept we
propose based on payoff knowledge rules out a sequential-equilibrium outcome
that passes the CC.
In some other games, payoff information expands the set of long-run learn-
ing outcomes for patient and long-lived learners. Example 3 shows a signaling
game where no type with payoff information ever experiments with a certain
signal, so the receivers’ beliefs and behavior after this signal are arbitrarily
determined from their prior beliefs. On the other hand, when senders are ig-
norant of the receivers’ payoff functions, one sender type will experiment much
more frequently with this signal than the other type, leading to a refinement
of the receivers’ off-path beliefs after the signal.
In general, for learners starting with these priors with restricted supports,
Theorem 1 shows that every patient learning outcome is consistent with “ra-
tional compatibility,” while Theorem 2 shows that every equilibrium satisfying
a uniform version of rational compatibility and some strictness assumptions
can arise as a patient learning outcome. As we show in Section 3, these belief
restrictions resemble those imposed by divine equilibrium (Banks and Sobel,
1987): Every divine equilibrium is also consistent with rational compatibility
and that every equilibrium satisfying the uniform version of rational compat-
ibility is universally divine.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is most closely related to the work of Fudenberg and Levine (1993),
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and Fudenberg and He (2018) on patient learn-
ing by Bayesian agents who believe they face a steady-state distribution of
play. Except for the support of the agents’ priors, our learning model is ex-
actly the same as that of Fudenberg and He (2018), and the proof of Theorem
1This example is a simplified variant of Cho and Kreps (1987)’s beer-quiche game, with
an extra conditionally dominated response for the receiver.
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1 follows the lines of our results there. Theorem 2 is the main technical inno-
vation. It establishes a sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be patiently
stable, which means that it is the limit of play in a society of Bayesian agents
as these agents become patient and long lived, for some non-doctrinaire prior
beliefs. The proof of this sufficient condition for patient stability constructs
a suitable prior and analyzes the corresponding patiently stable profiles. The
only other constructive sufficient condition2 for strategy profiles to be patiently
stable is Theorem 5.5 of Fudenberg and Levine (2006), which only applies to a
subclass of perfect-information games. In such games the relative probabilities
of various off-path actions do not matter, because each off-path experiment
is perfectly revealed when it occurs. Indeed, the central lemma leading to
Theorem 2 constructs a prior belief to ensure that the receivers correctly learn
the relative frequencies that different types undertake various off-path exper-
iments. This lemma deals with an issue specific to signaling games, and is
not implied by any result in Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Our paper is also
related to other models of Bayesian non-equilibrium learning, such as Kalai
and Lehrer (1993) and Esponda and Pouzo (2016), and to the equilibrium
concepts of the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and divine equilib-
rium (Banks and Sobel, 1987). One other contribution of this work relative
to Fudenberg and He (2018) is that we compare our learning-based equilib-
rium refinements with these equilibrium refinements, both of which implicitly
assume that players are certain of the payoff functions of their opponents.
2“Constructive,” as opposed to proofs that rule out all but one equilibrium using neces-
sary conditions and then appeal to an existence theorem for patiently stable steady states.
Constructive sufficient conditions allow us to characterize learning outcomes more precisely
in games where multiple equilibria satisfy the necessary conditions, such as Example 1.
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2 Two Equilibrium Refinements for Signaling
Games
2.1 Signaling Game Notation
A signaling game has two players, a sender (“she,” player 1) and a receiver
(“he,” player 2). At the start of the game, the sender learns her type θ ∈ Θ,
but the receiver only knows the sender’s type distribution3 λ ∈ ∆(Θ). Next,
the sender chooses a signal s ∈ S. The receiver observes s and chooses an
action a ∈ A in response. We assume that Θ, S, A are finite and that λ(θ) > 0
for all θ.
The players’ payoffs depend on the triple (θ, s, a). Let u1 : Θ×S×A→ R
and u2 : Θ × S × A → R denote the utility functions of the sender and the
receiver, respectively.
For P ⊆ ∆(Θ), we have
BR(P, s) :=
⋃
p∈P
(
arg max
a∈A
Eθ∼p [u2(θ, s, a)]
)
as the set of best responses to s supported by some belief in P . Letting
P = ∆(Θ), the set ABRs := BR(∆(Θ), s) ⊆ A contains the receiver actions
that best respond to some belief about the sender’s type after s. We say
that actions in ABRs are conditionally undominated after signal s, and that
actions in A\ABRs are conditionally dominated after signal s. We denote by
Π•2 := ×s∈S∆(ABRs ) the rational receiver strategies; these are the strategies that
assign probability 0 to conditionally dominated actions.4 The rational receiver
strategies form a subset of Π2 := ×s∈S∆(A), the set of all receiver strategies. A
sender who knows the receiver’s payoff function expects the receiver to choose
a strategy in Π•2.
A sender strategy pi1 = (pi1(· | θ))θ∈Θ ∈ Π1 specifies a distribution on S for
each type, pi(· | θ) ∈ ∆(S). For a given pi1, signal s is off the path of play if it
3The notation ∆(X) means the set of all probability distributions on X.
4Throughout we adopt the terminology “strategies” to mean behavior strategies, not
mixed strategies.
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has probability 0, i.e. pi1(s | θ) = 0 for all θ. Let
Sθ :=
⋃
pi2∈Π2
(
arg max
s∈S
u1(θ, s, pi2(· | s))
)
.
be the set of signals that best respond to some (not necessarily rational) re-
ceiver strategy for type θ. Signals in S\Sθ are dominated for type θ, and
Π•1 := ×θ∆ (Sθ) denotes the rational sender strategies where no type ever
sends a dominated signal. We also write Θs for the types θ for whom s ∈ S is
not dominated. A receiver who knows the sender’s payoff function expects the
sender to choose a strategy in Π•1 and only expects types in Θs to play signal
s.
2.2 Rationality-Compatible Equilibria
We now introduce rationality-compatible equilibrium (RCE) and uniform rationality-
compatible equilibrium (uRCE), two refinements of Nash equilibrium in sig-
naling games.
In Section 4, we develop a steady-state learning model where populations
of senders and receivers, initially uncertain as to the aggregate play of the
opponent population, undergo random anonymous matching each period to
play the signaling game. We study the steady states when agents are patient
and long lived, which we term “patiently stable.” Under some strictness as-
sumptions, we show that only RCE can be patiently stable (Theorem 1) and
that every uRCE is path-equivalent to a patiently stable profile (Theorem 2).
Thus we provide a learning foundation for these solution concepts.
Our learning foundation will assume that agents know other agents’ utility
functions and know that other agents are rational in the sense of playing
strategies that maximize the corresponding expected utilities. We will not
however iteratively assume higher orders of payoff knowledge and rationality,
so that we model “rationality” as opposed to “rationalizability.” 5
5It is straightforward to extend our results to priors that reflect higher-order knowledge of
the rationality and payoff functions of the other player. The resulting equilibrium refinement
always exists, and like RCE is implied by universal divinity. We do not include it here both
because we are unaware of any interesting examples where the additional power has bite,
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In the learning model, this implies senders’ uncertainty about receivers’
play is always supported on Π•2 instead of Π2, and similarly receivers’ uncer-
tainty about senders’ play is supported on Π•1 instead of Π1. In Section 2.3,
we discuss heuristically how our solution concepts capture some of the ways in
which payoff information affects learning outcomes. This discussion will later
be formalized in the context of the learning model we develop in Section 4.
Definition 1. Signal s is more rationally-compatible with θ′ than θ′′ , written
as θ′ %s θ
′′ , if for every pi2 ∈ Π•2 such that
u1(θ
′′
, s, pi2(·|s)) ≥ max
s′ 6=s
u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)),
we have
u1(θ
′
, s, pi2(·|s)) > max
s′ 6=s
u1(θ
′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)).
In words, θ′ %s θ
′′ means whenever s is a weak best response for θ′′ against
some rational receiver behavior strategy pi2, it is a strict best response for θ
′
against pi2.
The next proposition shows that %s is transitive and “almost” asymmetric.
A signal s is rationally strictly dominant for θ if it is a strict best response
against any rational receiver strategy, pi2 ∈ Π•2. A signal s is rationally strictly
dominated for θ if it is not a weak best response against any rational receiver
strategy.
Proposition 1. We have
1. %s′ is transitive.
2. Except when s′ is either rationally strictly dominant for both θ′ and θ′′
or rationally strictly dominated for both θ′ and θ′′ , θ′ %s′ θ
′′ implies
θ
′′ 6%s′ θ′ .
The Appendix provides proofs for all of our results except where otherwise
noted.
We require two auxiliary definitions before defining RCE.
and because we are skeptical about the hypothesis of iterated rationality.
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Definition 2. For any two types θ′ , θ′′ , let Pθ′.θ′′ be the set of beliefs where
the odds ratio of θ′ to θ′′ exceeds their prior odds ratio, that is6
Pθ′.θ′′ :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θ
′′)
p(θ′) ≤
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′)
}
. (1)
Note that if pi1(s|θ′) ≥ pi1(s|θ′′), pi1(s|θ′) > 0, and the receiver updates
beliefs using pi1, then the receiver’s posterior belief about the sender’s type
after observing s falls in the set Pθ′.θ′′ . In particular, in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, the receiver’s on-path belief falls in Pθ′.θ′′ after any on-path signal
s with θ′ %s θ
′′ .
We now introduce some additional definitions to let us investigate the im-
plications of the agents’ knowledge of their opponent’s payoff function. For a
strategy profile pi∗, let Epi∗ [u1 | θ] denote type θ’s expected payoff under pi∗.
Definition 3. For any strategy profile pi∗, let
J˜(s, pi∗) :=
{
θ ∈ Θ : max
a∈ABRs
u1(θ, s, a) ≥ Epi∗ [u1 | θ]
}
.
This is the set of types for which some best response to signal s is at least
as good as their payoff under pi∗. For all other types, the signal s is equilibrium
dominated in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Definition 4. The set of rationality-compatible beliefs for the receiver at strat-
egy profile pi∗,
(
P˜ (s, pi∗)
)
s
, is defined as follows:

P˜ (s, pi∗) := ∆(J˜(s, pi∗))⋂
 ⋂
(θ′ ,θ′′ ) s.t. θ′%sθ′′
Pθ′.θ′′
 if J˜(s, pi∗) 6= ∅
P˜ (s, pi∗) := ∆(Θs) if J˜(s, pi∗) = ∅.
The main idea behind the rationality-compatible beliefs is that the re-
ceiver’s posterior likelihood ratio for types θ′ and θ′′ dominates the prior like-
lihood ratio whenever θ′ %s θ
′′ . A second feature involves equilibrium domi-
6With the convention 00 := 0.
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nance. Note that P˜ assigns probability 0 to equilibrium-dominated types; this
is similar to the belief restriction of the Intuitive Criterion. Note that this def-
inition imposes no belief restrictions based on θ′ %s θ
′′ when s is equilibrium
dominated for every type. As we illustrate in Example 3, the receiver needs
not learn the rational compatibility relation when equilibrium dominance leads
to steady states where no type ever experiments with a certain signal.
Definition 5. Strategy profile pi∗ is a rationality-compatible equilibrium (RCE)
if it is a Nash equilibrium and pi∗2(· | s) ∈ ∆(BR(P˜ (s, pi∗), s)) for every s.
RCE requires that the receiver only plays best responses to rationality-
compatible beliefs after each signal. This solution concept allows for the
possibility that after off-path signals the receiver’s strategypi∗2(· | s) may not
correspond to a single belief about the sender’s type.
Theorem 1 shows that RCE is a necessary condition for a strategy pro-
file where receivers have strict preferences after each on-path signal to be
patiently stable. Intuitively, this result holds because the optimal experimen-
tation behavior of the senders respects the compatibility order, and because,
since players eventually learn the equilibrium path, types will not experiment
much with signals that are equilibrium dominated. As we show in Section 3,
RCE rules out the implausible equilibria in a number of games, but is weaker
than some past signaling game refinements in the literature. However, RCE is
only a necessary condition for patient stability, which leaves open the question
of whether patient learning has additional implications. For this reason, we
now define uRCE, a subset of RCE (up to path-equivalence). As we show
below, uRCE is a sufficient condition for patient stability.
Definition 6. The set of uniformly rationality-compatible beliefs for the re-
ceiver is
(
Pˆ (s)
)
s
where
Pˆ (s) := ∆(Θs)
⋂ ⋂
(θ′ ,θ′′ ) s.t. θ′%sθ′′
Pθ′.θ′′
 .
Note that
(
Pˆ (s)
)
s
makes no reference to a particular strategy profile, unlike(
P˜ (s, pi∗)
)
s
. Since ∆(Θs) contains types for whom s is undominated and
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J˜(s, pi∗) contains types for whom s is equilibrium-undominated (relative to
the profile pi∗), we have P˜ (s, pi∗) ⊆ Pˆ (s) whenever J˜(s, pi∗) 6= ∅.
Definition 7. A Nash equilibrium strategy profile pi∗ is called a uniform
rationality-compatible equilibrium (uRCE) if for all θ, all off-path signals s
and all a ∈ BR(Pˆ (s), s), we have Epi∗ [u1 | θ] ≥ u1(θ, s, a).
The “uniformity” in uniform RCE comes from the requirement that every
best response to every belief in Pˆ (s) deters every type from deviating to the
off-path s. By contrast, a RCE is a Nash equilibrium where some best response
to P˜ (s, pi∗) deters every type from deviating to s.
Proposition 2. Every uRCE is path-equivalent to an RCE.
2.3 Examples
The following example illustrates that uRCE is a strict subset of RCE in some
games.
Example 1. Suppose a worker has either high ability (θH) or low ability (θL).
She chooses between three levels of higher education: None (N),College (C),
or Ph.D. (D). An employer observes the worker’s education level and pays
a wage, a ∈ {low, med, high}. The worker’s utility function is separable
between wage and (ability, education) pair, with u1(θ, s, a) = z(a) + v(θ, s)
where z(low) = 0, z(med) = 6, z(high) = 9 and v(θH ,N) = 0, v(θL,N) = 0,
v(θH ,C) = 2, v(θL,C) = 1, v(θH ,D) = −2, v(θL,D) = −4. (With this payoff
function, going to college has a consumption value while getting a Ph.D. is
costly.) The employer’s payoffs reflect a desire to pay a wage corresponding
to the worker’s ability and increased productivity with education, given in the
tables below.
N low med high
θH 0,-2 6,0 9,1
θL 0,1 6,0 9,-2
C low med high
θH 2,-1 8,1 11,2
θL 1,2 7,1 10,-1
D low med high
θH -2,0 4,2 7,3
θL -4,3 2,2 5,0
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No education level is dominated for either type and no wage is conditionally
dominated after any signal. Since v(θH , ·) − v(θL, ·) is maximized at D, it is
simple to verify that θH %D θL. Similarly, θL %N θH . There is no compatibility
relation at signal C.
When the prior is λ(θH) = 0.5, the strategy profile where the employer al-
ways pays a medium wage and both types of worker chooseC is a uRCE. This is
because Pˆ (N) contains only those beliefs with p(θH) ≤ 0.5, so BR(Pˆ (N),N) =
{low, med}. Both of these wages deter every type from deviating to N. At
the same time, no type wants to deviate to D, even if she gets paid the best
wage.
On the other hand, the equilibrium pi∗ where the employer pays low wages
for N and C, a medium wage for D, and both types choose D is an RCE
but not a uRCE. The belief that puts probability 1 on the worker being θL
belongs to P˜ (N, pi∗) and P˜ (C, pi∗) and induces the employer to choose low
wage. However, medium salary is a best response to λ ∈ Pˆ (N) and medium
wage would tempt type θL to deviate to N. 
In the learning model of Fudenberg and He (2018), agents do not know
others’ utility functions and have full-support prior beliefs about others’ play.
That paper’s compatibility criterion (CC) is based on a family of binary rela-
tions on types (one for each signal s) that are less complete than the rational
compatibility relations, because the condition that “whenever s is a weak best
response for θ′′ , it is also a strict best response for θ′” is required to hold for
all pi2 ∈ Π2 instead of only for pi2 ∈ Π•2. Hence, RCE is always at least as
restrictive as the CC, and RCE can eliminate some equilibria that the CC
allows.
Example 2. Consider a game where the sender has type distribution λ(θstrong) =
0.9, λ(θweak) = 0.1 and chooses between two signals In orOut. The game ends
with payoffs (0,0) if the sender chooses Out. If the sender chooses In, the re-
ceiver then chooses Up, Down, or X. Up is the receiver’s optimal response
if the sender is more likely to be θstrong, Down is optimal when the sender is
more likely to be θweak, and X is never optimal.7 This game has two sequential
7This is a modified version of Cho-Kreps “beer-quiche game,” where an outside option
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equilibrium outcomes: one involving both types choosing Out, and another
where both types go In and the receiver responds with Up.
Without payoff knowledge, a compatibility relation based on all pi2 ∈ Π2
does not rank the two types after signal In. If pi2(Down | In) = 2/3 and
pi2(X | In) = 1/3, for example, θweak finds In optimal but θstrong does not.
So the sequential equilibrium outcome Out satisfies the CC. However, since
X is conditionally dominated after In, we can verify that the stronger ratio-
nal compatibility relation ranks θstrong %In θweak and that the unique RCE is
the equilibrium where both types go In. Underlying this is the fact that if
the conditionally dominated response X is removed from the game tree, then
θstrong will experiment more frequently with In than θweak does because θstrong
potentially has more to gain. This story breaks down if senders do not know
receivers’ payoffs and thus suspect that X might be used after In. We will
show in Section 7 that for some full-support prior beliefs, θweak experiments
more with In than θstrong does under any patience level. 
While the previous example shows payoff information may lead to more
with certain payoffs (Out) replaces the Quiche signal. The responses Up and Down
correspond to Not Fight and Fight in the beer-quiche game, while X is a conditionally
dominated response for the receiver following In. Also, while our definition of signaling
games requires that the receiver has the same action set after every signal, this situation is
clearly equivalent to one where the receiver chooses Up, Down, or X after Out, but all of
these choices lead to the payoffs (0,0).
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refined learning predictions, the next one cautions that payoff information
may also expand the set of learning outcomes.
Example 3. Consider a game with two sender types, θ1 and θ2, equally likely,
and two possible signals, L or R. Payoffs are given in the tables below.
signal: L action: a1 action: a2 action: a3
type: θ1 −2, 0 2, 2 2, 1
type: θ2 −2, 1 2, 0 2, -1
signal: R action: a1 action: a2 action: a3
type: θ1 5, -1 -3, 2 -4, 0
type: θ2 -2, -1 1, 0 0, 1
Action a1 is conditionally dominated for the receiver after signal R. It is
easy to see that in every perfect Bayesian equilibrium pi∗, we must have pi∗1(L |
θ1) = pi∗1(L | θ2) = 1, pi∗2(a2 | L) = 1, and that pi∗2(· | R) must be supported on
ABRR = {a2, a3}. This means the off-path signal R is equilibrium dominated
for every type in pi∗, i.e. J˜(R, pi∗) = ∅. So, P˜ (R, pi∗) = ∆(ΘR) = ∆(Θ) and
RCE permits the receiver to play either a2 or a3 after R. (This is despite the
fact that θ2 is more rationally compatible with R than θ1 is. As we discussed
after Definition 4, RCE does not restrict the receiver’s belief based on rational
type compatibility after an off-path signal that is equilibrium dominated for
every type.)
We will show in Section 7 that when learners have payoff information, there
is a patiently stable state where the receivers play a2 after R and another
patiently stable state where the receivers respond to R with a3. However, we
will also show that without payoff information, patient stability requires that
the receivers play a2 after R. 
3 Comparison to Other Equilibrium Refine-
ments
This section compares RCE to other equilibrium refinement concepts in the
literature.
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3.1 Iterated dominance
We first relate RCE to a form of iterated dominance in the ex-ante strategic
form of the game, where the sender chooses a signal pi1 as function of her
type. We show that every sender strategy that specifies playing signal s as a
less compatible type θ′′ but not as a more compatible type θ′ will be removed
by iterated deletion. The idea is that such a strategy is never a weak best
response to any receiver strategy in Π•2: if the less compatible θ
′′ does not
have a profitable deviation, then the more compatible type strictly prefers
deviating to s.
Proposition 3. Suppose θ′ %s θ
′′. Then any ex-ante strategy of the sender
pi1 with pi1(s|θ′′) > 0 but pi1(s|θ′) < 1 is removed by strict dominance once the
receiver is restricted to using strategies in Π•2.
3.2 The Intuitive Criterion
We next relate RCE to the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 4. Every RCE satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
The next example shows that the set of RCE is strictly smaller than the set
of equilibria that pass the Intuitive Criterion. The idea is that the Intuitive
Criterion does not impose any restriction on the relative likelihood of two types
after a signal that is not equilibrium dominated for either of them, but RCE
can.
Example 4. Consider a signaling game where the prior probabilities of the
two types are λ(θ1) = 3/4 and λ(θ2) = 1/4, and the payoffs are:
signal: s′ action: a′ action: a′′
type: θ′ 4, 1 0, 0
type: θ′′ 6, 0 2, 1
signal: s′′ action: a′ action: a′′
type: θ′ 7, 1 3, 0
type: θ′′ 7, 0 3, 1
Against any receiver strategy, the two types θ′ and θ′′ get the same payoffs
from s′′ , but θ′′ gets strictly higher payoffs than θ′ from s′ . So, θ′ %s′′ θ
′′ .
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Consider now the Nash equilibrium in which the types pool on s′ , i.e.
pi∗1(s
′|θ′) = pi∗1(s′ |θ′′) = 1, pi∗2(a′ |s′) = 1, and pi∗2(a′′ |s′′) = 1. It passes the
Intuitive Criterion since the off-path signal s′′ is not equilibrium dominated
for either type. On the other hand, RCE requires that every action played with
positive probability in pi∗2(·|s′′) best responds to some belief p about sender’s
type satisfying p(θ2)
p(θ1) ≤
λ(θ2)
λ(θ1) =
1
3 . But action a
′′ does not best respond to any
such belief, so pi∗ is not an RCE. 
3.3 Divine Equilibrium
Next, we compare divine equilibrium with RCE and uRCE. For a strategy
profile pi∗, let
D(θ, s; pi∗) := {α ∈ MBR(s) s.t. Epi∗ [u1 | θ] < u1(θ, s, α)}
be the subset of mixed best responses8 to s that would make type θ strictly
prefer deviating from the strategy pi∗1(· | θ). Similarly let
D◦(θ, s; pi∗) := {α ∈ MBR(s) s.t. Epi∗ [u1 | θ] = u1(θ, s, α)}
be the set of mixed best responses that would make θ indifferent to deviating.
Proposition 5. 1. If pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium where s′ is off-path, and
θ
′ %s′ θ
′′
, then D(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ∪D◦(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ⊆ D(θ′ , s′ ; pi∗).
2. Every divine equilibrium is a RCE.
However, the converse is not true, as the following example illustrates.
Example 5. Consider the following signaling game with two types and three
signals, with prior λ(θ1) = 2/3.
s
′
a
′
a
′′
θ
′ 0, 1 -1, 0
θ
′′ 0, 0 -1, 1
s
′′
a
′
a
′′
θ
′ 2, 1 -1, 0
θ
′′ 1, 0 -1, 1
s
′′′
a
′
a
′′
θ
′ 5, 0 -3, 1
θ
′′ 0, 1 -2, 0
8To be precise, MBR(p, s) := arg max
α∈∆(A)
(Eθ∼p[u2(θ, s, α)]) and MBR(s) :=
∪p∈∆(Θ)MBR(p, s).
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We check that the following is a pure-strategy RCE: pi1(s
′|θ′) = pi1(s′|θ′′) =
1, pi2(a
′|s′) = 1, pi2(a′′|s′′) = 1, pi2(a′′ |s′′′) = 1. Evidently pi is a Nash equilibrium
and no type is equilibrium-dominated at any off-path signal. We now check
that we do not have θ′ %s′′ θ
′′ or θ′′ %s′′′ θ
′ . Observe that against the receiver
strategy p˜i2(a
′|s) = 12 for every s, s
′′ is strictly optimal for θ′′ but s′′′ is strictly
optimal for θ′ , so θ′ 6%s′′ θ′′ . And for the receiver strategy pˆi2(a′ |s) = 1 for every
s, s′′′ is strictly optimal for θ′ but s′′ is strictly optimal for θ′′ , so θ′′ 6%s′′′ θ′ .
This shows the strategy profile is an RCE.
However, D(θ′′ , s′′ ; pi) ∪D◦(θ′′ , s′′ ; pi) is the set of distributions on {a′ , a′′}
that put at least weight 0.5 on a′ . Any such distribution is in D(θ′ , s′′ ; pi). So
in every divine equilibrium, the receiver plays a best response to a belief that
puts weight no less than 2/3 on θ′ after signal s′′ , which can only be a′ .9 
This example illustrates one difference between divine equilibrium and
RCE: under divine equilibrium, the beliefs after signal s′′ only depend on
the comparison between the payoffs to s′′ with those of the equilibrium signal
s
′ , while the compatibility criterion also considers the payoffs to a third signal
s
′′′
. In the learning model, this corresponds to the possibility that θ′ chooses
to experiment with s′′′ at beliefs that induce θ′′ to experiment with s′′ .
Our RCE differs from divine equilibrium in another way: divine equilibrium
involves an iterative application of a belief restriction. The next example
illustrates this difference10.
Example 6. There are three types, θ′ , θ′′ , θ′′′ , all equally likely. The signal
space is S = {s′ , s′′}, and the set of receiver actions is A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
When any sender type chooses the signal s′ , all parties get a payoff of 0 re-
gardless of the receiver’s action. When the sender chooses s′′ , the payoffs are
determined by the following matrix.
9As noted by Van Damme (1987), it may seem more natural to replace the set α ∈
MBR(m) in the definitions of D and D0 with the larger set α ∈ co(BR(s)), which leads to
the weaker equilibrium refinement that Sobel, Stole, and Zapater (1990) call “co-divinity”.
This example also shows that RCE need not be co-divine.
10We thank Joel Sobel for this example.
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s
′′
a1 a2 a3 a4
θ
′ 1, 0.9 -1, 0 -2, 0 -7, 0
θ
′′ 5, 0 3, 1 -1, 0 -5, 0.8
θ
′′′ -3, 0 5, 0 1, 1.7 -3, 0.8
Consider the pure strategy profile pi∗1(s
′|θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ and pi∗2(a4|s) =
1 for all s ∈ S. Since θ′′ gains more from deviating to s′′ than θ′ does, applying
the divine belief restriction for the off-path signal s′′ eliminates the action a1,
since it is not a best response to any belief p ∈ ∆(Θ) with p(θ′′) ≥ p(θ′).
But after action a1 is deleted for the receiver after signal s′′ , type θ′′′ now
gains more from deviating to s′′ than θ′′ does. So, applying the divine belief
restriction again eliminates actions a2 and a4, since it is not a best response
against any p ∈ ∆(Θ) with p(θ′) = 0 (for now s′′ is equilibrium dominated for
θ
′) and p(θ′′′) ≥ p(θ′′). So pi∗ is not a divine equilibrium.
On the other hand, no type is equilibrium dominated at s′′ and the only
rational compatibility order is θ′′ %s′′ θ
′ . But a4 is a best response against
the belief p(θ′) = 0, p(θ′′) = 0.6, p(θ′′′) = 0.4, which belongs to the set
∆(Θs′′ )
⋂
Pθ′′.θ′ . So pi∗ is an RCE. 
Finally, we show that every uRCE is path-equivalent to an equilibrium that
is not ruled out by the “NWBR in signaling games” test (Banks and Sobel,
1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987),11 which comes from iterative applications of the
following pruning procedure: after signal s the receiver is required to put 0
probability on those types θ such that
D◦(θ, s; pi∗) ⊆ ∪θ′ 6=θD(θ
′
, s; pi∗).
If this would delete every type, then the procedure instead puts no restriction
on receiver’s beliefs and no type is deleted.
By “path-equivalent” we mean that by modifying some of the receiver’s
off-path responses, but without altering the sender’s strategy or the receiver’s
on-path responses, we can change the uRCE into another uRCE that passes
11This is closely related to, but not the same as, the NWBR property of Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986).
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the NWBR test. Since every equilibrium passing the NWBR test is universally
divine (Cho and Kreps, 1987), this implies that every uRCE is path-equivalent
to a universally divine equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Every uRCE is path-equivalent to a uRCE that passes the
NWBR test.
Corollary 1. Every uRCE is path-equivalent to a universally divine equilib-
rium.
3.4 Summary
To summarize this subsection, we note that for strategy profiles that are on-
path strict for the receiver, we have the following inclusion relationships. The
first inclusion should be understood as inclusion up to path-equivalence. We
use the symbol “(” to mean that the former solution set is always nested
within the latter one in every signaling game, and that there exist games
where the nesting relationship is strict.
uRCE ( universally divine equilibria ( RCE ( Intuitive Criterion ( Nash equilibria.
4 Steady-State Learning in Signaling Games
4.1 Random Matching and Aggregate Play
We study the same discrete-time steady-state learning model as Fudenberg
and He (2018) except for an extra restriction on the players’ prior beliefs over
other players’ strategies.
There is a continuum of agents in the society, with a unit mass of receivers
and λ(θ) mass of type θ senders. Each population is further stratified by age,
with a fraction (1−γ) ·γt of each population age t for t = 0, 1, 2, ... At the end
of each period, each agent has probability 0 ≤ γ < 1 of surviving into the next
period, increasing their age by 1. With complementary probability, the agent
dies. Each agent’s survival is independent of calendar time and independent
of the survival of other agents. At the start of the next period, (1 − γ) new
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receivers and λ(θ)(1 − γ) new type θ senders are born into the society, thus
preserving population sizes and the age distribution.
Agents play the signaling game every period against a randomly matched
opponent. Each sender has probability (1 − γ)γt of matching with a receiver
of age t, while each receiver has probability λ(θ)(1− γ)γt of matching with a
type θ sender of age t.
4.2 Learning by Individual Agents with Payoff Knowl-
edge
Each agent is born into a player role in the signaling game: either a receiver
or a type θ sender. Agents know their role, which is fixed for life. The agents’
payoff each period is determined by the outcome of the signaling game they
played, which consists of the sender’s type, the signal sent, and the action
played in response. The agents observe this outcome, but the senders does not
observe how her matched receiver would have played had she sent a different
signal.
In addition to only surviving to the next period with probability 0 ≤ γ < 1,
agents discount12 future utility flows by 0 ≤ δ < 1 and seek to maximize
expected discounted utility. Letting ut represent the payoff t periods from
today, each agent’s objective function is E[∑∞t=0(γδ)t · ut]. (Define 00 := 1, so
that a myopic agent just maximizes current period’s expected payoff in every
period.)
Agents believe they face a fixed but unknown distribution of opponents’
aggregate play, updating their beliefs at the end of every period based on
the outcome in their own game. Formally, each sender is born with a prior
density function over receivers’ behavior strategies, g1 : Π2 → R+ . Similarly,
each receiver is born with a prior density over the senders’ behavior strategies,
g2 : Π1 → R+. We denote the marginal distribution of g1 on signal s as
g
(s)
1 : ∆(A)→ R+, so that g(s)1 (pi2(·|s)) is the density of the new senders’ prior
12We separately consider survival probability and patience so that we may consider agents
who are impatient relative to their expected lifespan. Such agents experiment early in their
life cycle, but spend most of their life myopically best responding to their beliefs, which
makes our analysis more tractable.
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over how receivers respond to signal s. Similarly, we denote the θ marginal of
g2 as g(θ)2 : ∆(S)→ R+, so that g(θ)2 (pi1(·|θ)) is the new receivers’ prior density
over the signal choice of type θ.
We now state a regularity assumption on agents’ priors that will be main-
tained throughout.
Definition 8. A prior g = (g1, g2) is regular if
(a). [independence] g1(pi2) =
∏
s∈S
g
(s)
1 (pi2(·|s)) and g2(pi1) =
∏
θ∈Θ
g
(θ)
2 (pi1(·|θ)).
(b). [payoff knowledge] g1 puts probability 1 on Π•2 and g2 puts probability 1
on Π•1.
(c). [g1 non-doctrinaire] g1 is continuous and strictly positive on the interior
of Π•2.
(d). [g2 nice] For each type θ, there are positive constants
(
α(θ)s
)
s∈S such that
pi1(·|θ) 7→ g
(θ)
2 (pi1(·|θ))∏
s∈S pi1(s|θ)α(θ)s −1
is uniformly continuous and bounded away from zero on the relative
interior of Π•θ, the set of rational behavior strategies of type θ.
This assumption bears the same name as the regularity assumption in Fu-
denberg and He (2018), and is identical except that agents now know others’
payoffs and others’ rationality. In the learning model, this payoff knowledge
translates into a restriction on the supports of the priors g1, g2, reflecting a
dogmatic belief that senders will never play dominated signals and receivers
will never play conditionally dominated actions. (These beliefs are correct in
the learning model.)
Even with payoff knowledge, the receiver’s prior can assign positive prob-
ability to ex-ante dominated sender strategies. For instance, in the signaling
game below,
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the sender strategy pi1(s
′′ | θ′) = pi1(s′′ | θ′′) = 1 belongs to the set Π•1, and
so must belong to the support of any regular receiver prior. But, even though
s
′′ ∈ Sθ′ and s′′ ∈ Sθ′′ , the receiver strategies to which they respectively
best respond form disjoint sets, and pi1 is ex-ante dominated because it is not
a best response to any single receiver strategy. It is nevertheless consistent
for a receiver who knows the sender’s payoff as a function of their type to
assign positive density to pi1, because different types of agents can choose best
responses to different beliefs about receiver play.
4.3 History and Aggregate Play
Let Yθ[t] := (∪s∈S(s×ABRs ))t represent the set of possible histories for a type θ
sender with age t. Note that a valid history encodes the signal that θ sent each
period and the (conditionally undominated) action that her opponent played
in response. Let Yθ :=
⋃∞
t=0 Yθ[t] be the set of all histories for type θ.
Similarly, write Y2[t] := (Θ × Sθ)t for the set of possible histories for a
receiver with age t. Each period, his history encodes the type of the matched
sender and the (undominated) signal observed. The union Y2 :=
⋃∞
t=0 Y2[t]
then stands for the set of all receiver histories.
The agents’ dynamic optimization problems discussed in Subsection 4.2
give rise to optimal policies13 σθ : Yθ → Sθ and σ2 : Y2 → ×s(ABRs ). Here,
σθ(yθ) is the signal that a type θ sender with history yθ would send the next
13For notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of these optimal policies on the
effective discount factor δγ and on the priors.
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time she plays the signaling game. Analogously, σ2(y2) is the pure extensive-
form strategy that a receiver with history y2 would commit to next time he
plays the game. In the learning model, each agent solves a (single-agent)
dynamic optimization problem, and chooses a deterministic optimal policy.
A state ψ of the learning model is a demographic description of how many
agents have each possible history. It can be viewed as a distribution
ψ ∈ (×θ∈Θ∆(Yθ))×∆(Y2),
and its components are denoted by ψθ ∈ ∆(Yθ) and ψ2 ∈ ∆(Y2).
Since each state ψ is a distribution over histories and optimal policies map
histories to play, ψ induces a distribution over play (i.e., a rational behavior
strategy) in the signaling game σ(ψ) ∈ Π•, given by
σθ(ψθ)(s) := ψθ {yθ ∈ Yθ : σθ(yθ) = s}
and
σ2(ψ2)(a | s) := ψ2 {y2 ∈ Y2 : σ2(y2)(s) = a} .
Here, σθ(ψθ) and σ2(ψ2) are the aggregate behaviors of the type θ and
receiver populations in state ψ, respectively. Note that the aggregate play of
a population can be stochastic even if the entire population uses the same
deterministic optimal policy, because different senders will be matched with
different receivers, and so different agents on the same side will observe differ-
ent histories and play differently.
Of particular interest are the steady states, to be defined more precisely in
Section 6. Loosely speaking, a steady state induces a time-invariant distribu-
tion over how the signaling game is played in the society.
5 Aggregate Responses and Steady State
This section defines the notion of a steady state using the “aggregate re-
sponses” of one population to the distribution of play in the other. These
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responses are defined using the “one-period forward” maps that describe how
the agents’ policies induce a map from current distributions over histories to
what the distributions will be after the agents are matched and play the game
using the strategies their policies prescribe.
5.1 The Aggregate Sender Response
Fix the receivers’ aggregate play at pi2 ∈ Π•2 and fix an optimal policy σθ for
each type θ. The one-period-forward map for type θ, fθ, describes the distribu-
tion over histories that will prevail next period when the current distributions
over histories in the type-θ population is ψθ. The next definition specifies the
probability that fθ[ψθ, pi2] assigns to the history (yθ, (s, a)) ∈ Yθ[t+ 1], that is
to say a one-period concatenation of (s, a) onto the history yθ ∈ Yθ[t].
Definition 9. The one-period-forward map for type θ, fθ : ∆(Yθ) × Π•2 →
∆(Yθ) is
fθ[ψθ, pi2](yθ, (s, a)) := ψθ(yθ) · γ · 1{σθ(yθ) = s} · pi2(a | s)
and fθ(∅) := 1− γ.
To interpret, of the ψθ(yθ) fraction of the type-θ population with history
yθ, a γ fraction survives into the next period. The survivors all choose σθ(yθ)
next period, which is met with response a with probability pi2(a | σθ(yθ)).
Write fTθ for the T -fold application of fθ on ∆(Yθ), holding fixed some pi2.
It is easy to show that limT→∞ fTθ (ψθ, pi2) exists and is independent of the
initial ψθ. (This is because for any two states ψθ, ψ
′
θ, the two distributions
over histories fTθ (ψθ, pi2) and fTθ (ψ
′
θ, pi2) agree on all Yθ[t] for t < T . As T
grows large, the two resulting distributions must converge to each other since
the fraction of very old agents with very long histories is rare.) Denote this
limit as ψ˜pi2θ . It is the distribution over type-θ history induced by the receivers’
aggregate play pi2.
Definition 10. The aggregate sender response R1 : Π•2 → Π•1 is defined by
R1[pi2](s | θ) := ψ˜pi2θ (yθ : σθ(yθ) = s)
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That is, R1[pi2](· | θ) describes the asymptotic aggregate play of the type-θ
population when the the aggregate play of the receiver population is fixed at
pi2 each period. Note that R1 maps into Π•1 because no type ever wants to send
a dominated signal, even as an experiment, regardless of their beliefs about
the receiver’s response.
Technically, R1 depends on g1, δ, and γ, just like σθ does. When relevant,
we will make these dependencies clear by adding the appropriate parameters
as superscripts to R1, but we will mostly suppress them to lighten notation.
5.2 The Aggregate Receiver Response
We now turn to the receivers, who have a passive learning problem. They
always observe the sender’s type and signal at the end of each period, so their
optimal policy σ2 myopically best responds to the posterior belief at every
history y2.
Definition 11. The one-period-forward map for the receivers f2 : ∆(Y2) ×
Π•1 → ∆(Y2) is
f2[ψ2, pi1](y2, (θ, s)) := ψ2(y2) · γ · λ(θ) · pi1(s|θ)
and f2(∅) := 1− γ.
As with the one-period-forward maps fθ for senders, f2[ψ2, pi1] describes the
distribution over receiver histories next period starting with a society where
the distribution is ψ2 and the sender population’s aggregate play is pi1. We
write ψ˜pi12 := limT→∞ fT2 (ψ2, pi1) for the long-run distribution over Y2 induced
by fixing sender population’s play at pi1. (This limit is again independent of
the initial state ψ2.)
Definition 12. The aggregate receiver response R2 : Π•1 → Π•2 is
R2[pi1](a | s) := ψ˜pi12 (y2 : σ2(y2)(s) = a)
24
5.3 Steady States and Patient Stability
A steady-state strategy profile is a pair of mutual aggregate replies, so it is
time-invariant under learning.
Definition 13. pi∗ is a steady-state strategy profile if Rg,δ,γ1 (pi∗2) = pi∗1 and
Rg,δ,γ2 (pi∗1) = pi∗2. Denote the set of all such strategy profiles as Π∗(g, δ, γ).
We now state two results about these steady states. We do not provide a
proof because they follow easily from analogous results in Fudenberg and He
(2018).
First, steady-state profiles always exist.
Proposition 7. For any regular prior g and any 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, Π∗(g, δ, γ) is
non-empty and compact in the norm topology.
The patiently stable strategy profiles correspond to the set limδ→1 limγ→1 Π∗(g, δ, γ).
This order of limits was first introduced in Fudenberg and Levine (1993). It
ensures agents spend most of their lifetime playing myopically instead of ex-
perimenting, which is important for proving that patiently stable profiles are
Nash equilibria.
Definition 14. For each 0 ≤ δ < 1, a strategy profile pi∗ is δ-stable under
g if there is a sequence γk → 1 and an associated sequence of steady-state
strategy profiles pi(k) ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γk), such that pi(k) → pi∗. Strategy profile pi∗
is patiently stable under g if there is a sequence δk → 1 and an associated
sequence of strategy profiles pi(k) where each pi(k) is δk-stable under g and
pi(k) → pi∗. Strategy profile pi∗ is patiently stable if it is patiently stable under
some regular prior g.
Proposition 8. If strategy profile pi∗ is patiently stable, then it is a Nash
equilibrium.
Note that Propositions 7 and 8 apply even if all of the Nash equilibria
of the game are in mixed strategies; as noted above, the randomization here
arises from the random matching process.
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6 Patient Stability, Payoff Knowledge, and Equi-
librium Refinements
In this section, we relate the equilibrium refinements proposed in Section 2
to the steady-state learning model. We show that under certain strictness
assumptions, RCE is necessary for patient stability while uRCE is sufficient
for patient stability. We also discuss how payoff knowledge matters for learning
outcomes.
6.1 RCE Is Necessary for Patient Stability
We show that any patiently stable strategy profile satisfying a strictness as-
sumption must be an RCE. The key lemma is analogous to Lemma 1 from
Fudenberg and He (2018), so we will omit its proof.
Lemma 1. Suppose θ′ %s θ
′′. Then for any regular prior g1, 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1,
and any pi2 ∈ Π•2, we have R1[pi2](s | θ′) ≥ R1[pi2](s | θ′′).
This result says over their lifetimes, the relative frequencies with which
different sender types experiment with signal s respect the rational compat-
ible order %s. This follows from the fact that sender types who are more
compatible with a signal will play it at least as often. The payoff knowledge
embedded in g1’s support implies that senders never experiment in the hopes
of seeing a response which is highly profitable for the sender but dominated
for the receiver, such as the Charity action in Example 2 for θweak. This extra
assumption leads to a stronger result than Lemma 1 from Fudenberg and He
(2018), which is stated in terms of the less-complete compatibility order.
For a fixed strategy profile pi and on-path signal s∗, let Eθ|pi1,s∗ [u2(θ, s∗, a)]
denote the receiver’s expected utility from responding to s∗ with a, where the
expectation over the sender’s type θ is taken with respect to the posterior type
distribution after signal s∗ given the sender’s strategy pi1(· | θ).
Definition 15. A Nash equilibrium pi∗ is on-path strict for the receiver if for
every on-path signal s∗, pi2(a∗ | s∗) = 1 for some a∗ ∈ A and Eθ|pi1,s∗ [u2(θ, s∗, a∗)] >
maxa6=a∗ Eθ|pi1,s∗ [u2(θ, s∗, a)].
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We call this condition “on-path” strict for the receiver because we do not
make assumptions about the receiver’s incentives after off-path signals. For
generic payoffs, all pure-strategy equilibria will be on-path strict for the re-
ceiver.
Theorem 1. Every strategy profile that is patiently stable and on-path strict
for the receiver is an RCE.
RCE rules out two kinds of receiver beliefs after signal s: those that assign
non-zero probability to equilibrium-dominated sender types, and those that
violate the rational compatibility order. The restriction on equilibrium dom-
inated types uses the assumption that the receiver has a strict best response
to each on-path signal to put a lower bound on how slowly aggregate receiver
play at on-path signals converges to its limit.14 The fact that the receiver be-
liefs respect the rational compatibility order comes from Lemma 1, which uses
our assumptions about prior g to derive restrictions on the aggregate sender
response R1, and show that these are reflected in the aggregate receiver re-
sponse. The proof of Theorem 1 closely follows the the analogous proof in
Fudenberg and He (2018) and is omitted.
6.2 Quasi-Strict uRCE is Sufficient for Patient Stability
We now prove our main result: as a partial converse to Theorem 1, we show
that under additional strictness conditions, every uRCE is path-equivalent to
a patiently stable strategy profile.
Definition 16. A quasi-strict uRCE pi∗ is a uRCE that is on-path strict for
the receiver, strict for the sender (that is, there exists an equilibrium signal
s∗ for each type θ with u1(θ, s∗, pi∗2(·|s∗)) > maxs 6=s∗ u1(θ, s, pi∗2(·|s)), so every
type strictly prefers its equilibrium signal to any other), and satisfies Epi∗ [u1 |
θ] > u1(θ, s
′
, a) for all θ, all off-path signals s′ and all a ∈ BR(Pˆ (s′), s′).
14If the receiver mixes after some equilibrium signal s for type θ, then our techniques for
showing that θ does not experiment very much with equilibrium dominated signals do not
go through, but we do not have a counterexample.
27
The last condition in the definition of quasi-strictness requires that every
best response to Pˆ (s′) strictly deters every type from deviating to s′ , whenever
s
′ is off-path. Every uRCE satisfies the weaker version of this condition where
“strictly deters” is replaced with “weakly deters.”
Theorem 2. If pi∗ is a quasi-strict uRCE, then it is path-equivalent to a pa-
tiently stable strategy profile.
This theorem follows from three lemmas on R1 and R2. Indeed, the the-
orem remains valid in any modified learning model where R1 and R2 satisfy
the conclusions of these lemmas.
6.2.1 R1 under a confident prior
The first lemma shows that under a suitable prior, the aggregate sender re-
sponse of the dynamic learning model approximates the sender’s static best
response function when applied to certain receiver strategies, namely strategies
that are “close” to one inducing a unique optimal signal for each sender type.
The precise meaning of “close” that we use treats on- and off-path responses
differently, so it requires some auxiliary definitions.
Definition 17. Let pi∗ be a strategy profile where every type plays a pure
strategy and the receiver plays a pure action after each on-path signal. Say pi∗
induces a unique optimal signal for each sender type if
Epi∗ [u1 | θ] > max
s 6=pi∗1(θ)
u1(θ, s, pi∗2(·|s))
for every type θ.
Starting with a strategy profile pi∗ that induces a unique optimal signal for
each sender type, define for each off-path s in pi∗ the set of receiver actions
A˜(s) := {a : Epi∗ [u1 | θ] > u1(θ, s, a) ∀θ} that strictly deter every type from
deviation. Because pi∗2 induces a unique optimal signal, each A˜(s) must contain
at least one element in the support of pi∗2(·|s), but could also contain other
actions. It is clear that if pi∗2 were modified off-path by changing each pi∗2(·|s)
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to be an arbitrary mixture over A˜(s), then the resulting strategy profile would
continue to induce (the same) unique optimal signal for each sender type.
For pi∗ that induces a unique optimal signal for each sender type, write
Bon2 (pi∗, ) for the elements of Π•2 no more than  away from pi∗2 at the on-path
signals in pi∗1, that is
Bon2 (pi∗, ) := {pi2 ∈ Π•2 : |pi2(a|s)− pi∗2(a|s)| ≤ ,∀a, on-path s in pi∗} .
Similarly, define Boff2 (pi∗, ) as the elements of Π•2 putting no more than 
probability on actions outside of A˜(s) after each off-path s, where A˜(s) is the
set of actions that would deter every type from deviating to s, as above.
Boff2 (pi∗, ) :=
{
pi2 ∈ Π•2 : pi2(A˜(s)|s) ≥ 1− ,∀ off-path s in pi∗
}
.
Lemma 2. Suppose pi∗ induces a unique optimal signal for each sender type.
Then there exists a regular prior g1, some 0 < off < 1, and a function γ(δ, )
valued in (0, 1), such that for every 0 < δ < 1, 0 <  < off, and γ(δ, ) < γ < 1,
if pi2 ∈ Bon2 (pi∗, ) ∩Boff2 (pi∗, off), then |Rg1,δ,γ1 [pi2](s|θ)− pi∗1(s|θ)| <  for every
θ and s.
Note that the same  appears in the hypothesis pi2 ∈ Bon2 (pi∗, ) as in the
conclusion. That is, the aggregate sender response gets closer to pi∗1 as receivers’
play gets closer to pi∗2.
The idea is to specify a sender prior g1 that is highly confident and correct
about the receiver’s response to on-path signals, and is also confident that the
receiver responds to each off-path signal s with actions in A˜(s). Take a signal
s
′ other than the one that θ sends in pi∗1. If θ has not experimented much
with s′ , then her belief is close to the prior and she thinks deviation does not
pay. If θ has experimented a lot with s′ , then by the law of large numbers
her belief is likely to be concentrated in A˜(s′), so again she thinks deviation
does not pay. Since the option value for experimentation eventually goes to 0,
at most histories all sender types are playing a myopic best response to their
beliefs, meaning they will not deviate from pi∗1. The intuition is similar to that
of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.4 from Fudenberg and Levine (2006), which says that
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we can construct a highly concentrated and correct prior so that in the steady
state, most agents have correct beliefs about opponents’ play both on and one
step off the equilibrium path.
This lemma requires the assumption that pi∗ is strict for the sender. If
s∗ were only weakly optimal for θ in pi∗, there could be receiver strategies
arbitrarily close to pi∗2 that make some other signal s
′ 6= s∗ strictly optimal
for θ. In that case, we cannot rule out that a non-negligible fraction of the θ
population will rationally play s′ forever when the receiver population plays
close to pi∗2.
6.2.2 R2 and learning rational compatibility
Let C be the set of sender strategies that respect the rational compatibility
order, that is
C := {pi1 ∈ Π•1 : pi1(s|θ) ≥ pi1(s|θ
′) whenever θ %s θ
′}.
The next lemma shows that there is a prior for the receivers so that when
the aggregate sender play is any strategy in C, almost all receivers end up
with beliefs consistent with the rational compatibility order. This lemma
is the main technical contribution of the paper and enables us to provide
a sufficient condition for patient stability when the relative frequencies of off-
path experiments matter.
Lemma 3. For each  > 0, there exists a regular receiver prior g2 and 0 <
γ < 1 so that for any γ < γ < 1, 0 < δ < 1, and pi1 ∈ C,
Rg2,δ,γ2 [pi1](BR(Pˆ (s), s) | s) ≥ 1− 
for each signal s.
The key step in the proof is constructing a prior belief for the receivers
so that when the senders’ aggregate play is sufficiently close to the target
equilibrium, the receiver beliefs respect the compatibility order. This step was
not necessary in Fudenberg and Levine (2006), which is the only other paper
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that has given a sufficient condition for patient stability in a class of games15.
To prove Lemma 3, we construct a Dirichlet prior g2 so that for any s such
that θ′ %s θ
′′ , g2 assigns much greater prior weight to θ
′ playing s than to θ′′
playing s..16 In the absence of data, the receiver strongly believes that the
senders are using strategies pi1 such that p(θ
′′ |s)/p(θ′|s) ≤ λ(θ′′)/λ(θ′). This
strong prior belief can only be overturned by a very large number of observa-
tions to the contrary. But because pi1 ∈ C respects the rational compatibility
order, if the receiver has a very large number of observations of senders choos-
ing s, the law of large numbers implies this large sample is unlikely to lead
the receiver to have a belief outside of Pˆ (s). So we can ensure that with high
probability sufficiently long-lived receivers play a best response to Pˆ (s) after
the off-path s.
Finally, we state a lemma that says for any Dirichlet receiver prior, when
lifetimes are long enough, the aggregate receiver response approximates the
receiver’s best response function on-path when applied to a sender strategy
that provides strict incentives after every on-path signal. Write Bon1 (pi∗, ) for
the elements of Π•1 where each type θ plays -close to pi∗1(·|θ) , that is
Bon1 (pi∗, ) := {pi1 ∈ Π•1 : |pi1(s|θ)− pi∗1(s|θ)| ≤ ,∀θ, s} .
Lemma 4. Fix a strategy profile pi∗ where the receiver has strict incentives
after every on-path signal. For each regular Dirichlet receiver prior g2, there
exists 1 > 0 and a function γ() valued in (0, 1), so that whenever pi1 ∈
Bon1 (pi∗, 1), 0 < δ < 1, and γ() < γ < 1, we have R
g2,δ,γ
2 [pi1](a|s)−pi∗2(a|s)| < 
for every on-path signal s in pi∗ and a.
The intuition is that when the aggregate sender strategy is close to pi∗1,
15Their result guarantees that the receivers’ beliefs about the frequency of type θ sending
signal s is within  of the truth. This is not sufficient for purposes, because when signal s
has probability 0 under a given sender strategy, perturbing the strategy of every type by up
to  can generate arbitrary off-path beliefs about the sender’s type.
16The Dirichlet prior is the conjugate prior to multinomial data, and corresponds to the
updating used in fictitious play (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993). It is readily verified that if
each of g(θ)1 and g
(s)
2 is Dirichlet and independent of the other components, then g is regular.
In the proof, we work with Dirichlet priors since they give tractable closed-form expressions
for the posterior mean belief of the opponent’s strategy after a given history.
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the law of large numbers implies that after each signal that pi∗1 gives positive
probability, a receiver with enough data is likely to have a belief close to the
Bayesian belief assigned by pi∗1. Coupled with the fact that pi∗1 is on-path strict
for the receiver, this lets us conclude that long-lived receivers play pi∗2(·|s) after
every on-path s with high probability.
7 Payoff Information and Steady-State Learn-
ing
We revisit the examples from Section 2.3 and discuss how prior beliefs reflecting
knowledge or ignorance of payoff information lead to different implications for
learning.
7.1 Example 2
In Example 2, it follows from Lemma 1 that for any 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, any re-
ceiver play pi2 ∈ Π•2, and any regular prior g, we have Rg11 [pi2](In | θstrong) ≥
Rg11 [pi2](In | θweak). In the absence of payoff information,we show that there
exists a full-support prior g1 so that, fixing pi2 to always play Down, we get
Rg11 [pi2](In | θstrong) ≤ Rg11 [pi2](In | θweak) for any 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, with strict
inequality for an open set of parameter values.
Let g(In)1 be Dirichlet with weights (1, K, 1) on (Up,Down,X) for arbitrary
K ≥ 4. After observing k ≥ 0 instances of receivers responding to In with
Down, a sender would have the posterior Dirichlet(1, K + k, 1). The θweak
type’s Gittins index for In would be unchanged if her payoffs to (Up, Down,
X) were (3,−1, 1) instead of (1,−1, 3), by symmetry of her beliefs about Up
and X. This observation shows her Gittins index for In is at least as large
as θstrong’s, whose payoffs to (Up, Down, X) are (2,−1, 1). So the strong
type switches away from In after fewer observations of Down than the weak
type does (this includes the case of “switching away” after 0 observations of
Down, i.e. the strong type never experimenting with In.) We have proven
Rg11 [pi2](In | θstrong) ≤ Rg11 [pi2](In | θweak) for any 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1.
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Signal In is myopically suboptimal for both types, and by the previous
argument, the minimum effective discount factor δγ that would induce at
least one period of experimentation with In is strictly higher for the strong
type than the weak type. This shows for an open set of δ, γ parameters,
Rg11 [pi2](In | θstrong) = 0 but Rg11 [pi2](In | θweak) > 0.
7.2 Example 3
In Example 3 we showed that there is an RCE in which the receivers play a3
after R. Because RCE is not a sufficient condition for patient stability, this
leaves open the question of whether this strategy can arise in our learning
model. Here we verify that it can, and also show that “a3 after R” cannot
be part of a patiently stable outcome in the absence of payoff information.
This is because patient but inexperienced θ1’s without payoff information find
it plausible that receivers choose a1 after R, so they will experiment much
more frequently with the off-path signal R than θ2’s, for whom every possible
response to R leads to worse payoffs than their equilibrium payoff of 2. As a
result, receivers learn thatR-senders have type θ1 so they respond with a2. On
the other hand, when senders know ex-ante that receivers will never choose a1
after R, for some priors there are steady states where no one ever experiments
with R. When this happens, the receivers’ belief about the likelihood ratio
of the types following the off-path R is governed by their prior beliefs, which
may be arbitrary and thus support a richer class of learning outcomes.
Specifically, in Example 3, suppose g(L)1 is Dirichlet (1, 10, 1) over all three
responses to L, while g(R)1 is Dirichlet(1, 1) on ABRR = {a2, a3}, which reflects
the sender’s knowledge that a1 is a conditionally dominated response to R.
And suppose that gθ12 is the Dirichlet(2, 1) distribution on {L, R} and gθ22 is
the Dirichlet(2, x) distribution, where x > 0 is a free parameter. For any
0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, there exists a steady state where senders always choose L and
receivers always respond to L with a2. This is because the Gittins index for R
is no larger than −3 for θ1 and no larger than 1 for θ2 after any history, while
the myopic expected payoff of L already exceeds these values in the first period.
The expected payoff of L only increases with additional observations of a2 after
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L. On the receiver side, every positive-probability history y2 must involve the
senders playing L every period. Following such a history, the receiver believes
θ1 plays L with probability at least 23 , hence an L-sender is the θ1 type with
probability at least 2/31+2/3 =
2
5 . We have a2 ∈ BR({p},L) whenever p(θ1) ≥ 25 ,
so we have shown that in the steady state receivers always play a2 after L.
In this steady state, signal R is never sent, so by choosing different values
of x > 0, we can sustain either a2 or a3 after R as part of a patiently stable
profile. To be more precise, let n1 and n2 count the number of times the two
types of senders appear in a positive-probability history y2. The receiver’s
posterior assigns the following likelihood ratio to the type of an R-sender:
1
3 + n1
/
x
2 + x+ n2
= 1
x
·
(2 + x+ n2
3 + n1
)
.
Since the two types are equally likely, the fraction of receivers with histories y2
so that 0.9 ≤
(
2+x+n2
3+n1
)
≤ 1.1 approaches 1 as γ → 1. Depending on whether
x = 1/4 or x = 4, these receivers will play a2 or a3 after R, so pi2(a2 | R) = 1
and pi2(a3 | R) = 1 are both δ-stable for any δ ≥ 0, under two different regular
priors reflecting payoff knowledge.
By contrast, Theorem 3 of Fudenberg and He (2018) implies that if priors
g1, g2 have full support on Π2 and Π1 respectively, then we must have a2 after
R in every patiently stable profile. The idea is that when senders are patient
and long-lived, new θ1 start off by trying R but new θ2 start off by trying L.
When receivers play a2 after L with high probability, it is very unlikely that
θ2 ever switches away from L, providing a bound on their frequency of playing
R. On the other hand, as their effective discount factor increases, θ1 will spend
arbitrarily many periods of its early life playing R in hopes of getting the best
payoff of 5, lacking the payoff knowledge that a1 is conditionally dominated
for the receivers after R. Receivers therefore end up learning that R-senders
have type θ1.
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8 Conclusion
This paper studies non-equilibrium learning about other players’ strategies in
the setting of signaling games. When the agents’ prior beliefs about their op-
ponents’ play reflect prior knowledge of others’ payoff functions, the steady
states of societies of Bayesian learners can be bounded by two equilibrium
refinements, RCE and uRCE, that nest and resemble divine equilibrium. Di-
vine equilibrium and RCE are only defined for signaling games. In general
extensive-form games, agents may find it optimal to play strictly dominated
strategies as experiments to learn about the consequences of their other strate-
gies, so requiring prior beliefs to be supported on opponents’ undominated
strategies can lead to situations where agents observe play that they had as-
signed zero prior probability. We leave the associated complications for future
work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To show (1), suppose θ′ %s′ θ
′′ and θ′′ %s′ θ
′′′
. For any pi2 ∈ Π•2 where s′
is weakly optimal for θ′′′ , it must be strictly optimal for θ′′ , hence also strictly
optimal for θ′ . This shows θ′ %s′ θ
′′′ .
To establish (2), partition the set of rational receiver strategies as Π•2 =
Π+2 ∪ Π02 ∪ Π−2 , where the three subsets refer to receiver strategies that make
s
′ strictly better, indifferent, or strictly worse than the best alternative signal
for θ′′ . If the set Π02 is nonempty, then θ
′ %s′ θ
′′ implies θ′′ 6%s′ θ′ . This
is because against any pi2 ∈ Π02, signal s′ is strictly optimal for θ′ but only
weakly optimal for θ′′ . At the same time, if both Π+2 and Π−2 are nonempty,
then Π02 is nonempty. This is because both pi2 7→ u1(θ′′ , s′ , pi2(·|s′)) and pi2 7→
maxs′′ 6=s′ u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pi2(·|s′′)) are continuous functions, so for any pi+2 ∈ Π+2 and
pi−2 ∈ Π−2 , there exists α ∈ (0, 1) so that αpi+2 + (1 − α)pi−2 ∈ Π02. (Note that
pi+2 and pi−2 must be supported on ABRs after every signal s, so the same must
hold for the mixture αpi+2 + (1−α)pi−2 . Thus, this mixture also belongs to Π•2.)
If only Π+2 is nonempty and θ
′ %s′ θ
′′ , then s′ is rationally strictly dominant
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for both θ′ and θ′′ . If only Π−2 is nonempty, then we can have θ
′′ %s′ θ
′ only
when s′ is never a weak best response for θ′ against any pi2 ∈ Π•2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let pi∗ be a uRCE. We construct a path-equivalent RCE, pi◦ as follows.
Set pi◦1 = pi∗1 and set pi◦2(· | s) = pi∗2(· | s) for every on-path signal s.At each
off-path signal s where J˜(s, pi∗) 6= ∅, let pi◦2(· | s) prescribe some best response
to a belief in P˜ (s, pi∗).At each off-path signal s where J˜(s, pi∗) = ∅, let pi◦2(· | s)
prescribe some best response to a belief in ∆(Θs).
In this strategy profile, the receiver’s play is a best response to rationality-
compatible beliefs after every off-path s by construction, and because the
sender’s play is the same as before the receiver is still playing best responses
to on-path signals.
Because the on-path play of the receivers did not change, no sender type
wishes to deviate to any on-path signal. Now we check that no sender type
wishes to deviate to any off-path signal. Consider first off-path s where
J˜(s, pi∗) 6= ∅. Here we have J˜(s, pi∗) ⊆ Θs, which implies that P˜ (s, pi∗) ⊆ Pˆ (s).
By the definition of uRCE, pi◦2(· | s) must deter every type from deviating to
such s. Finally, no sender type wishes to deviate to any s where J˜(s, pi∗) = ∅,
by the definition of equilibrium dominance.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Fix a pi1 with pi1(s|θ′′) > 0 but pi1(s|θ′) < 1. Because the space of
rational receiver strategies Π•2 is convex, it suffices to show there is no receiver
strategy pi2 ∈ Π•2 such that pi1 is a best response to pi2 in the ex-ante strategic
form. If pi1 is an ex-ante best response, then it needs to be at least weakly
optimal for type θ′′ to play s against pi2. By θ
′ %s θ
′′ , this implies s is strictly
optimal for type θ′ . This shows pi1 is not a best response to pi2, as the sender
can increase her ex-ante expected payoffs by playing s with probability 1 when
her type is θ′ .
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose pi∗ does not pass the Intuitive Criterion. Then there exists a
type θ and a signal s′ such that
u1(θ; pi∗) < min
a∈BR(∆(J˜(s′ ,pi∗)),s)
u1(θ, s
′
, a).
If pi∗ were an RCE, then we would have pi∗2(·|s′) ∈ ∆(BR(P˜ (s, pi∗), s)). Since
P˜ (s, pi∗) ⊆ ∆(J˜(s′ , pi∗)), we have
u1(θ; pi∗) < u1(θ, s
′
, pi∗2(·|s
′)).
This means pi∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. To show (a), note first that if D(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ∪ D◦(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) = ∅ the
conclusion holds vacuously. If D(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ∪ D◦(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗)is not empty, take
any α′ ∈D(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ∪ D◦(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) and define pi′2 ∈ Π•2 by pi′2(·|s′) = α′ ,
pi
′
2(·|s) = pi∗2(·|s) for s 6= s′ . Then
u1(θ
′′ ; pi∗) = max
s 6=s′
u1(θ
′′
, s, pi
′
2(·|s)) ≤ u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, pi
′
2(·|s
′)) = u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, α
′),
and when θ′ %s′ θ
′′
, this implies that
u1(θ
′ ; pi∗) = max
s 6=s′
u1(θ
′
, s, pi
′
2(·|s)) < u1(θ
′
, s
′
, pi
′
2(·|s
′)) = u1(θ
′
, s, α
′).
Hence α′ ∈ D(θ′ , s′ ; pi∗).
To show (b), suppose pi∗ is a divine equilibrium. Then it is a Nash equilib-
rium, and furthermore for any off-path signal s′ where θ′ %s′ θ
′′
, Proposition
5(a) implies that
D(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ∪D◦(θ′′ , s′ ; pi∗) ⊆ D(θ′ , s′ ; pi∗).
Since pi∗ is a divine equilibrium, pi∗2(·|s′) must then best respond to some belief
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p ∈ ∆(Θ) with p(θ
′′)
p(θ′) ≤
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′) . Considering all (θ
′
, θ
′′) pairs, we see that in a
divine equilibrium pi∗2(·|s′) best responds to some belief in
⋂
(θ′ ,θ′′ ) s.t. θ′%
s
′ θ′′
Pθ′.θ′′ .
At the same time, in every divine equilibrium, belief after off-path s′ puts zero
probability on equilibrium-dominated types, meaning pi∗2(· | s′) best responds
∆(J˜(s′ , pi∗)). This shows pi∗ is an RCE.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Consider a uRCE pi∗. For every off-path s, perform the following mod-
ifications on pi∗2(·|s): if the first-round application of the NWBR procedure
would have deleted every type, then do not modify pi∗2(·|s). Otherwise, find
some θs not deleted by the iterated NWBR procedure, then change pi∗2(·|s) to
some action in BR({θs}, s), i.e. a best response to the belief putting probabil-
ity 1 on θs.
This modified strategy profile passes the NWBR test. We now establish
that it remains a uRCE by checking that for those off-path s where pi∗2(·|s) was
modified, the modified version is still a best response to Pˆ (s). (By uniformity,
this would ensure that the modified receiver play continues to deter every type
from deviating to s.)
Type θs satisfies θs ∈ Θs. Otherwise, D◦(θs, s; pi∗) = ∅ and θs would have
been deleted by NWBR in the first round. Now it suffices to argue there
is no θ′ such that θ′ %s θs, which implies the belief putting probability 1
on θs is in Pˆ (s). If there were such θ
′
, by Proposition 5(a) we would have
D◦(θs, s; pi∗) ⊆ D(θ′ , s; pi∗), so θs should have been deleted by NWBR in the
first round, contradicting the fact that θs survives all iterations of the NWBR
procedure.
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A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. This is follows from Proposition 6 because every NWBR equilibrium is
a universally divine equilibrium.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Here are three lemmas from Fudenberg and Levine (2006):
FL06 Lemma A.1: Suppose {Xk} is a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables with E[Xk] = µ, and define for each n the random variable
Sn :=
|∑nk=1(Xk − µ)|
n
.
Then for any n, n¯ ∈ N,
P
[
max
n≤n≤n¯
Sn > 
]
≤ 2
7
3 ·
1
n
· µ
4
.
FL06 Lemma A.2: For all , ′ > 0, there is an N > 0 so that for all
δ, γ, g, pi, signal s and action a ∈ A,
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ {yθ : |pˆi2(a|s; yθ)− pi2(a|s)| > ,#(s|yθ) > N} < ′.
(Here, pˆi2(a|s; yθ) is the empirical frequency of receiver playing a after signal
m in history yθ, that is to say pˆi2(a|s; yθ) = #((a, s), yθ)/#(s, yθ).)
FL06 Lemma A.4: For all , ′ > 0 and δ < 1, there exists N such that
for all pi, g, and γ, we get
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ {yθ /∈ Yθ(),#(σθ(yθ), yθ) > N} ≤ ′
where Yθ() ⊆ Yθ are those histories yθ where
max
s∈S
u1(θ, s|yθ) ≤ u1(σθ(yθ)|yθ) + ,
that is, type θ is playing a myopic  best response according to posterior belief
after history yθ.
Now we proceed with our argument.
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Since pi∗ is strict on-path , there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0 such that whenever pi2
satisfies |pi2(a|s) − pi∗2(a|s)| ≤ ξ1 for every on-path s and action a, while for
every off-path s we have pi2(A˜(s)|s) ≥ 1− ξ1, then for each type θ we get
u1(θ, pi∗1(θ), pi2) > ξ2 + max
s 6=pi∗1(θ)
u1(θ, s, piR).
That is, if receiver plays ξ1-close to pi∗ on-path and ξ1-close to A˜(s) off-path,
then for every type of sender, playing the prescribed equilibrium signal is
strictly better than any other signal by at least ξ2 > 0.
Following Fudenberg and Levine (2006), consider a prior g1 such that when-
ever sender has fewer than n := 211/ξ41 observations of playing signal s, her
belief as to receiver’s probability of taking action a after signal s differs from
pi∗1(a|s) by no more than ξ1 if s is on-path, while her belief as to the probability
that receiver strategy assigns to A˜(s) is at least 1− ξ if s is off-path. Also, let
off := ξ1/2.
Now let δ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 <  < off be given. We construct γ(δ, ) satisfying
the conclusion of the lemma.
To do this, in FL06 Lemma A.4 put  = ξ2 and 
′ = /6, to obtain a
N1(). Next, in FL06 Lemma A.2 put  = ξ1/2, 
′ = /6, to obtain N2(). Let
N() := N1() ∨ N2(). There are 5 classes of exceptional histories for type θ
that can lead to playing some signal sˆ other than the one prescribed by the
equilibrium strategy, s∗ := pi∗1(θ).
Exception 1: θ has played sˆ fewer than N() times before, that is σθ(yθ) =
sˆ but #(sˆ, yθ) < N(). Such histories can be made to have mass no larger than
/6 by taking γ(δ, ) large enough.
Exception 2: yθ is in the exceptional set described in FL06 Lemma A.4.
But by choice of N() ≥ N1(), we know that
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ {yθ /∈ Yθ(ξ2),#(σθ(yθ), yθ) > N()} ≤ /6.
Exception 3: θ has played sˆ more than N() times, but has a misleading
sample. By FL93 Lemma A.2,
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ {yθ : |pˆi2(a|sˆ; yθ)− pi2(a|sˆ)| > ξ1/2,#(sˆ|yθ) > N()} < /6.
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Since we have chosen pi ∈ Bon2 (pi∗, ) ∩ Boff2 (pi∗, off), we know pi2 differs from
pi∗2 by no more than off = ξ1/2 after every on-path signal, and puts no more
weight than ξ1/2 on actions not in A˜(s) after off-path signal s. So in particular,
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ
yθ :
|pˆi2(a|sˆ; yθ)− pi∗2(a|sˆ)| > ξ1 if sˆ on-path, or
pˆi2(A˜(sˆ)|sˆ) < 1− ξ1 if sˆ off-path
#(sˆ|yθ) > N()
 < /6.
Exception 4: θ has played the equilibrium signal s∗ more than N() times,
but has a misleading sample. As before, we get
ψ
pi2;(g,δ,γ)
θ {yθ : |pˆi2(a|s∗; yθ)− pi∗2(a|s∗)| > ξ1,#(s∗|yθ) > N()} < /6.
Exception 5: θ has played the equilibrium signal s∗ between n and N()
times, but has a misleading sample. Let Xk ∈ {0, 1} denote whether θ sees
the equilibrium response pi∗2(s∗) the k-th time she plays s∗ (Xk = 0) or whether
she sees instead a different response (Xk = 1). As in FL06 Lemma A.1, define
Sn :=
|∑nk=1(Xk − µ)|
n
where µ = 1− pi2(pi∗2(s∗)|s∗) <  since s∗ is an on-path signal in pi∗.
The probability that the fraction of responses other than pi∗1(s∗) exceeds ξ1
between then-th time and N()-th time that θ plays s∗ is bounded above by
FL06 Lemma A.1,
P
[
max
n≤n≤N()
Sn > ξ1/2
]
≤ 2
7
3 ·
1
n
· µ(ξ1/2)4
≤ 13 · µ (by choice of n)
≤ 1/3.
Finally, at a history yθ that does not belong to those exceptions, we must
have σθ(yθ) = m∗. This is because yθ is not in exception 1, so θ has played
σθ(yθ) at least N() times before, and it is not in exception 2, so σθ(yθ) is a
ξ2 myopic best response to current beliefs. Yet the empirical frequency for
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response after signal σθ(yθ) is no more than ξ1 away from pi∗2(σθ(yθ)) as yθ is
not in exception 3 . Since the prior is Dirichlet and also has this property, this
means the current posterior belief about response after signal σθ(yθ) also has
this property. If #(s∗, yθ) > n, then yθ not being in exceptions 4 or 5 implies
belief as to response after signal s∗ is also no more than ξ1 away from pi∗2(s∗),
while if #(s∗, yθ) < n then choice of prior implies the same. In short, beliefs
on both responses after s∗ and responses after σθ(yθ) are no more than ξ1 away
from their pi∗2 counterparts. But in that case, no signal other than s∗ can be
an ξ2 best response.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For each ξ > 0, consider the approximation to Pθ′.θ′′ ,
P ξ
θ′.θ′′ :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θ
′′)
p(θ′) ≤ (1 + ξ)
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′)
}
and hence the approximation to Pˆ (s),
Pˆξ(s) := ∆(Θs′ )
⋂{
P ξ
θ′.θ′′ : θ
′ %s′ θ
′′}
.
Since the BR correspondence has a closed graph, there is an ξ > 0 such that
BR(Pˆξ(s), s) = BR(Pˆ (s), s).
Take some such ξ. Next we will choose a series of constants.
• Pick 0 < h < 1 such that 1−h1+h > (1− ξ)1/3.
• Pick G > 0 such that for every θ ∈ Θ, 1/(h2 · G · (1 − h) · λ(θ)) <
/(4 · |S| · |Θ|2).
• For each θ, construct a Dirichlet prior on Sθ with parameters α(θ, s) ≥ 0.
Pick Dirichlet prior parameters α(θ, s) ≥ 0 so that whenever θ %s θ′, we
have
α(θ, s)− α(θ′ , s) > (
√
(4 · |S| · |Θ|2)/+ 1) ·G. (2)
In the event that θ %s θ
′ and θ′ %s θ, put α(θ, s) = α(θ
′
, s).
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• Pick N ∈ N so that for any N > N, θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, we have
P[(1− h) ·N · λ(θ) ≤ Binom(N, λ(θ)) ≤ (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ)] > 1− 4 · |Θ|
and
(1− h) ·N · λ(θ′)
(1 + h) ·N · λ(θ) + maxθ∑s∈S α(θ, s) > (1− ξ)1/3
λ(θ′)
λ(θ) .
• Pick γ ∈ (0, 1) such that 1− (γ)N+1 < /4.
Suppose the receiver’s prior over the strategy of typeθ is Dirichlet with pa-
rameters (α(θ, s))s∈S. We claim that the conclusion of the lemma holds.
Fix some strategy pi1 ∈ C. Write #(θ|y2) for the number of times the
sender has been of θ type in history y2, while #(θ, s|y2) counts the number
of times type θ has sent signal s in history y2. Put ψ2 = ψpi1;(g,δ,γ)2 and write
E ⊆ Y2 for those receiver histories with length at least N satisfying
(1− h) ·N · λ(θ) ≤ #(θ|y2) ≤ (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ)
for every θ ∈ Θ. By the choice of N and γ, whenever γ > γ we have ψ(E) ≥
1 − /2. We now show that given E, the conditional probability that the
receiver’s posterior belief after every off-equilibrium signal s lies in Pˆξ(s) is at
least 1− /2. To do this, fix signal s and two types with θ %s θ′ .
If s is strictly dominated for both θ and θ′ , then according to the receivers’
Dirichlet prior, θ and θ′ each sends s with zero probability. Since pi ∈ Π•1,
we have pi1(s|θ) = pi1(s|θ′) = 0. So after every positive-probability history,
receiver’s belief falls in Pˆξ(s) as it puts zero probability on the s-sender being
θ or θ′ . Henceforth we only consider the case where s is not strictly dominated
for both.
After history y2, the receiver’s updated posterior likelihood ratio for types
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θ and θ′ upon seeing signal s is
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) ·
(
α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
#(θ|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ, s)/
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2)
#(θ′|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ′ , s)
)
= λ(θ)
λ(θ′) ·
α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2) ·
#(θ′ |y2) +∑s∈S α(θ′ , s)
#(θ|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ, s) .
Since we have #(θ′|y2) ≥ (1− h) ·N · λ(θ′) while #(θ|y2) ≤ (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ),
we get
#(θ′|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ′ , s)
#(θ|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ, s) ≥
(1− h) ·N · λ(θ′)
(1 + h) ·N · λ(θ) +∑s∈S α(θ, s) > (1−ξ)1/3·
λ(θ′)
λ(θ) .
If s is strictly dominant for both θ and θ′ , then pi1 ∈ Π•1 means that pi1(s|θ) =
pi1(s|θ′) = 1. In this case, #(θ, s|y2) = #(θ|y2) and #(θ′ , s|y2) = #(θ′|y2).
Since #(θ|y2) ≥ (1− h) ·N · λ(θ), #(θ′ |y2) ≤ (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′), we have:
α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2) ≥
(1− h) ·N · λ(θ)∑
s∈S α(θ′ , s) + (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′)
≥ (1− ξ)1/3 λ(θ)
λ(θ′) .
This shows the product is no smaller than (1− ξ)2/3 λ(θ)
λ(θ′ ) , so receiver believes
in P ξ
θ.θ′ after every history in E.
Now we analyze the term α(θ,s)+#(θ,s|y2)
α(θ′ ,s)+#(θ′ ,s|y2) for the case where s is not strictly
dominant for both θ and θ′ . We consider two cases, depending on whether N is
“large enough” so that the compatible type θ experiments enough on average
in a receiver history of length N under sender strategy pi1.
Case A: pi1(s|θ) ·N < G. In this case, since pi ∈ C and θ %s θ′, we must
also have pi1(s|θ′)·N < G. Then #(θ′, s|y2) is distributed as a binomial random
variable with mean smaller thanG, hence standard deviation smaller than
√
G.
By Chebyshev’s inequality, the probability that it exceeds (
√
(4 · |S| · |Θ|2)/+
1) ·G is no larger than
1
G · (4 · |S| · |Θ|2)/ <

4|S| · |Θ|2 .
But in any history y2 where #(θ′, s|yR) does not exceed this number, we would
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have
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2) ≤ α(θ, s) ≤ α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
by choice of the difference between prior parameters α(θ′, s) and α(θ, s). There-
fore α(θ,s)+#(θ,s|y2)
α(θ′ ,s)+#(θ′ ,s|y2) ≥ 1. In summary, under Case A, there is probability no
smaller than 1− 4|S|·|Θ|2 that α(θ,s)+#(θ,s|y2)α(θ′ ,s)+#(θ′ ,s|y2) ≥ 1.
Case B: pi1(s|θ) ·N ≥ G. In this case, we can bound the probability that
#(θ, s|y2)/#(θ′ , s|y2) ≤ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (
1− h
1 + h)
2.
Let p := pi1(s|θ). Given that #(θ|y2) ≥ (1 − h) · N · λ(θ), the distribution of
#(θ, s|y2) first order stochastically dominates Binom((1− h) ·N · λ(θ), p).
On the other hand, given that #(θ|y2) ≤ (1+h) ·N ·λ(θ′) and furthermore
pi1(s|θ′) ≤ pi1(s|θ) = p, the distribution of #(θ′, s|y1) is first order stochastically
dominated by Binom((1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′), p).
The first distribution has mean (1−h) ·N ·λ(θ) ·p with standard deviation
no larger than
√
(1− h) ·N · λ(θ) · p. Thus
P [Binom((1− h) ·N · λ(θ), p) < (1− h) · (1− h) ·N · λ(θ) · p]
< 1/(h ·
√
p(1− h)Nλ(θ))2 ≤ 1/(h ·
√
G · (1− h) · λ(θ))2 < /(4 · |S| · |Θ|2)
where we used the fact that pN ≥ G in the second-to-last inequality, while
the choice of G ensured the final inequality.
At the same time, the second distribution has mean (1 + h) · N · λ(θ′) · p
with standard deviation no larger than
√
(1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′) · p, so
P [Binom((1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′), p) > (1 + h) · (1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′) · p]
< 1/(h ·
√
p(1 + h)Nλ(θ′))2 ≤ 1/(h ·
√
G · (1 + h) · λ(θ′))2 < /(4 · |S| · |Θ|2)
by the same arguments. Combining the bounds on these two binomial random
variables,
P
[
Binom((1− h) ·N · λ(θ), p)
Binom((1 + h) ·N · λ(θ′), p) ≤
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (
1− h
1 + h)
2
]
< /(2 · |S| · |Θ|2).
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Via stochastic dominance, this shows a fortiori
P
[
#(θ, s|y2)/#(θ′ , s|y2) ≤ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (
1− h
1 + h)
2
]
< /(2 · |S| · |Θ|2).
Therefore, for any s, θ, θ′ such that θ %s θ′,
ψ
(
y2 :
α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2) ≥
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (
1− h
1 + h)
2 | E
)
≥ 1− /(2 · |S| · |Θ|2).
This concludes case B.
In either case, at a history y2 with (1−h) ·N ·λ(θ) ≤ #(θ|y2) ≤ (1+h) ·N ·
λ(θ) for every θ, for every pair θ, θ′ such that θ %s θ′, we get α(θ,s)+#(θ,s|y2)α(θ′ ,s)+#(θ′ ,s|y2) ≥
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (1−h1+h)2 with probability at least 1− /(2 · |S| · |Θ|2).
But at any history y2 where this happens, the receiver’s posterior likelihood
ratio for types θ and θ′ after signal s satisfies
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) ·
α(θ, s) + #(θ, s|y2)
α(θ′ , s) + #(θ′ , s|y2) ·
#(θ′ |y2) +∑s∈S α(θ′ , s)
#(θ|y2) +∑s∈S α(θ, s)
≥ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) ·
λ(θ)
λ(θ′) ·
(
1− h
1 + h
)
2 · (1− ξ)1/3 · λ(θ
′)
λ(θ)
≥ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (1− ξ)
2/3 · (1− ξ)1/3 ≥ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (1− ξ).
As there are at most |Θ|2 such pairs for each signal s and |S| total signals,
ψ
y2 : λ(θ)λ(θ′) · α(θ,s)+#(θ,s|y2)α(θ′ ,s)+#(θ′ ,s|y2) · #(θ
′ |y2)+
∑
s∈S α(θ
′
,s)
#(θ|y2)+
∑
s∈S α(θ,s)
≥ λ(θ)
λ(θ′) · (1− ξ)
∀s, θ %s θ′ |E
 ≥ 1− /2
as claimed. As the event E has ψ-probability no smaller than 1 − /2, there
is ψ probability at least 1 −  that receiver’s posterior belief is in Pˆξ(s) after
every off-path s.
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A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Since pi∗ is on-path strict for the receiver, there exists some ξ > 0 such
that for every on-path signal s and every belief p ∈ ∆(Θ) with
|p(θ)− p(θ; s, pi∗)| < ξ, ∀θ ∈ Θ (3)
(where p(·; s, pi∗) is the Bayesian belief after on-path signal s induced by the
equilibrium pi∗), we have BR(p, s) = {pi∗2(s)}. For each s, we show that there
is a large enough N(s, ) and small enough ζ(s) so that when receiver observes
history y2 generated by any pi ∈ Bon(pi∗, ′) with ′ < ζ(s)/4 and length at
least N(s, ), there is probability at least 1 − 2|S| that receiver’s posterior
belief satisfies (3). Hence, conditional on having a history length of at least
N(s, ), there is 1 − 2|S| chance that receiver will play as in pi∗2 after s. By
taking the maximum N∗() := maxs(N(s, 1)) and minimum 1 := mins ζ(s),
we see that whenever history is length N∗() or more, and pi ∈ Bon(pi∗, ′) with

′
< 1, there is at least 1− /2 chance that the receiver’s strategy matches pi∗2
after every on-path signal . Since we can pick γ() large enough that 1− /2
measure of the receiver population is age N∗() or older, we are done.
To construct N(s, ) and ζ(s), let Λ(s) := λ{θ : pi∗1(s|θ) = 1}. Find small
enough ζ(s) ∈ (0, 1) so that:
• | λ(θ)Λ(s)·(1−ζ(s)) − λ(θ)Λ(s) | < ξ
• | λ(θ)·(1−ζ(s))Λ(s)+(1−Λ(s))·ζ(s) − λ(θ)Λ(s) | < ξ
• ζ(s)1−ζ(s) · λ(θ)Λ(s) < ξ
for every θ ∈ Θ. After a history y2, the receiver’s posterior belief as to the
type of sender who sends signal s satisfies
p(θ|s; y2) ∝ λ(θ) · #(θ, s|y2) + α(θ, s)#(θ|y2) + A(θ) ,
where α(θ, s) is the Dirichlet prior parameter on signal s for type θ and A(θ) :=∑
s∈S α(θ, s). By the law of large numbers, for long enough history length, we
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can ensure that if pi1(s|θ) > 1− ζ(s)4 , then
#(θ, s|y2) + α(θ, s)
#(θ|y2) + A(θ) ≥ 1− ζ(s)
with probability at least 1− 2|S|2 , while if pi1(s|θ) < ζ(s)/4, then
#(θ, s|y2) + α(θ, s)
#(θ|y2) + A(θ) < ζ(s)
with probability at least 1− 2|S|2 . Moreover there is some N(s, ) so that there
is probability at least 1 − 2|S| that a history y2 with length at least N(s, )
satisfies above for all θ. But at such a history, for any θ such that pi∗1(s|θ) = 1,
p(θ|s; y2) ≥ λ(θ) · (1− ζ(s))Λ(s) + (1− Λ(s)) · ζ(s)
and
p(θ|s; y2) ≤ λ(θ)Λ(s) · (1− ζ(s)) ,
while for some θ such that pi∗1(s|θ) = 0,
p(θ|s; y2) ≤ ζ(s)1− ζ(s) ·
λ(θ)
Λ(s) .
Therefore the belief p(·|s; yR) is no more than ξ away from p(θ; s, pi∗), as
desired.
A.11 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We will construct a regular prior g. We will then show that for every
0 < δ < 1, there exists convex and compact sets of strategy profiles Ej ⊆ Π•
with Ej ↓ E∗ ⊆ Bon1 (pi∗, 0)∩Bon2 (pi∗, 0) and a corresponding sequence of survival
probabilities γj → 1 so that (Rg,δ,γj1 [pi2],Rg,δ,γj2 [pi1]) ∈ Ej whenever pi ∈ Ej.
We proved in Fudenberg and He (2018) that R1 and R2 are continuous maps,
so a fixed point theorem implies that for each j, some strategy profile in Ej is
a steady state profile under parameters (g, δ, γj). Any convergent subsequence
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of these j-indexed steady state profiles has a limit in E∗, so this limit agrees
with pi∗ on path. This shows that for every δ there is a δ-stable strategy profile
path-equivalent to pi∗, so there is a patiently stable strategy profile with the
same property.
Step 1: Constructing g and some thresholds.
Since pi∗ induces a unique optimal signal for each sender type, by Lemma
2 find a regular sender prior g1, 0 < off < 0, and a function γLM1(δ, ).
In Lemma 3, substitute  = off to find a regular receiver prior g2 and
0 < γLM2 < 1.
Finally, in Lemma 4 let g2 be as constructed above to find LM3 > 0 and a
function γLM3().
Step 2: Constructing the sets Ej.
For each j, let
Ej := C ∩Bon1 (pi∗,
off ∧ LM3
j
) ∩Bon2 (pi∗,
off ∧ LM3
j
) ∩Boff2 (pi∗, off).
That is, Ej is the set of strategy profiles that respect rational compatibility,
differ by no more than off/j from pi∗ on path, and differ by no more than off
from pi∗ off path. It is clear that each Ej is convex and compact, and that
limj→∞Ej ⊆ Bon1 (pi∗, 0) ∩Bon2 (pi∗, 0) as claimed.
We may find an accompanying sequence of survival probabilities satisfying
γj > γLM1(δ,
off ∧ LM3
j
) ∨ γLM2 ∨ γLM3(
off ∧ LM3
j
)
with γj ↑ 1.
Step 3: Rg,δ,γj maps Ej into itself.
Let some pi ∈ Ej be given.
By Lemma 1 , Rg,δ,γj1 [pi2] ∈ C.
By Lemma 3, Rg,δ,γj2 [pi1] ∈ Boff2 (pi∗, off), because uniformity of pi∗ means
BR(Pˆ (s), s) ⊆ A˜(s) for each off-path s.
By Lemma 4, Rg,δ,γj2 [pi1] ∈ Bon2 (pi∗, off∧LM3j ).
Finally, from Lemma 2 and the fact that pi2 ∈ Bon2 (pi∗, off∧LM3j )∩Boff2 (pi∗, off),
we have Rg,δ,γj1 [pi2] ∈ Bon1 (pi∗, off∧LM3j ).
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